Abstract. Until recently, all known constructions of oblivious transfer protocols based on general hardness assumptions had the following form. First, the hardness assumption is used in a black-box manner (i.e., the construction uses only the input/output behavior of the primitive guaranteed by the assumption) to construct a semi-honest oblivious transfer, a protocol whose security is guaranteed to hold only against adversaries that follow the prescribed protocol. Then, the latter protocol is "compiled" into a (malicious) oblivious transfer using non-black techniques (a Karp reduction is carried in order to prove an NP statement in zeroknowledge).
Introduction
Since most cryptographic tasks are impossible to achieve with absolute, information-theoretic security, modern cryptography tries to design protocols that are infeasible to break. Namely, their security is based on computational hardness assumptions. These assumptions typically come in two flavors: specific hardness assumptions like discrete log, factoring and RSA, and general hardness assumptions like the existence of one-way functions. In this paper we refer to general hardness assumptions and how they are used. Primitives assumed to carry some hardness assumption can be used to construct a provably secure cryptographic tasks in two possible ways: "black-box usage", where the construction uses only the input/output behavior of the primitive, and "non-black-box usage", where the construction uses the internal structure of the primitive, e.g., its code. The above is formalized via the notion of blackbox reductions. A black-box reduction from a primitive P to a primitive Q, is an efficient construction of P out of Q that ignores the internal structure of the implementation of Q and merely uses it as a "subroutine" (i.e., as a black-box). Such a reduction is fully-black-box [25] if the proof of security (showing that an adversary that breaks the implementation of P implies an efficient adversary that breaks the implementation of Q), is black-box as well. That is, the internal structure of the adversary that breaks the implementation of P is ignored. See Section 2.2 for more details.
Staring from the seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [16] , a rich line of works tries to draw the border between possibility and impossibility for black-box reductions in cryptography. Currently, for most cryptographic tasks we either have a black-box reduction to a commonly believed hardness assumption, or have shown the impossibility of such a reduction. There are several important tasks, however, for which we have failed to apply the above black-box classification. Very interestingly, for most of those tasks we do have non-black-box reductions (typical examples are the reductions from oblivious transfer to semi-honest oblivious transfer [12] , and from public-key encryption schemes secure against chosen cipher-text attack to semantically-secure encryption schemes [8, 20, 26] ). In their recent breakthrough result, Ishai et al. [17] presented the first blackbox reduction from oblivious transfer to "low-level" primitives (to homomorphic encryption and to enhanced trapdoor permutations). Yet, the question whether there exists a black-box reduction from oblivious transfer to semi-honest oblivious transfer, remained open.
A better understanding of the above might help up to resolve the intriguing question whether non-black-box techniques are superior to black-box ones also in the setting of reductions between cryptographic primitives. 1 On a more practical level, we mention that the non-black-box reductions of the above tasks are using Karp reductions for the purpose of using a (general) zero-knowledge proof/argument. Such reductions are highly inefficient and unlikely to be used in practice. Furthermore, in most cases the communication complexity in the resulting protocols depends on the complexity of computing the underlying primitive (i.e., of the trapdoor permutations), where black-box reductions, unaware of the inner structure of the underlying primitive, do not suffer from this phenomenon (see [17] for more details).
In this paper, we study the above issues w.r.t. oblivious transfer. Oblivious transfer, introduced by Rabin [24] , is a fundamental primitive in cryptography and has several equivalent formulations [3, 5, 4, 6, 9, 24] . The version we study here, defined by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [9] , is that of one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. This version is an interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. The sender gets as an input two secret bits: σ 0 and σ 1 and the receiver gets an index i ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol, R learns σ i . Informally, the security of the oblivious transfer states that the receiver does not learn σ 1−i and the sender does not learn i. Oblivious transfer is known to imply key-agreement signing contracts protocols [2, 9, 24] and, more generally, secure multiparty computation in the presence of malicious majority [12, 18, 28] . We sometimes add the term malicious to the above definition, to differentiate it from definitions that guarantee weaker security.
Defensible Privacy
The notion of defensible privacy, introduced by Ishai et al. [17] , is a natural bridging step between semi-honest privacy and fully-fledged one. Informally, a two-party protocol (A, B) is defensibly private w.r.t. A and a function f defined over the parties' inputs (denoted as (A, f)-defensibly-private), if at the end of the interaction even a cheating A * cannot simultaneously prove that it has acted honestly (i.e., as the honest party would) and learn the value of f .
2 [17] showed how to use enhanced trapdoor permutation (or homomorphic encryption) to construct defensible oblivious transfer. Where the latter is a protocol with the oblivious transfer functionally, which is defensibly-private w.r.t. to the sender and the input bit of the receiver, and w.r.t. to the receiver and the other secret of the sender. That is, it is (S, f S ) and (R, f R ) defensibly-private, where S and R stand for sender and the receiver respectively, f S (σ 0 , σ 1 , i) [17] then show how to use such a defensible oblivious transfer to derive their main result.
Our Result
A two-party protocol (A, B) is (A, f)-semi-honest-private, if at the end of the interaction the semi-honest A does not learn the value of f . Our main technical contribution is the following theorem. As a corollary of Theorem 2, we have that there exists a fully-black-box reduction from oblivious transfer to each of the assumptions that known to imply semi-honest oblivious transfer in a fully-black-box manner. This list currently includes families of dense/enhanced trapdoor permutations [9, 13] , homomorphic encryption [19, 27] and non-trivial single-server private-information retrieval [7] . In addition, Kilian [18] tells us that secure multiparty computation can be blackbox reduced to oblivious transfer. Hence, we also have the following corollary.
Theorem 1. Let π = (A, B) be a two-party protocol and let f
A , f B : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} k → {0,
Corollary 2.
There exist fully-black-box reductions from protocols for securely computing any multiparty functionality with an honest-minority and in the presence of static malicious adversaries, to semi-honest oblivious transfer.
Our Technique -From Semi-Honest to Defensible Privacy
Given a protocol π = (A, B) that is (A, f A ) and (B, f B ) semi-honest-private, and assuming that one-way functions exist, we create the protocol π = (A, B) that is (A, f A ) and (B, f B ) defensibly-private. Our reduction is carried out in two steps. First, we create a protocol (A, B) with the same functionality as (A, B), which is (A, f A )-defensibly-private and (B, f B )-semi-honest-private. Then, we apply the same transformation on (A, B), to strengthen also the privacy w.r.t. f B . In what follows we describe how to obtain the first step (the second step is analogous), but first let us describe what a commitment scheme is. In a commitment scheme the sender interacts with the receiver to commit to a private value; informally the commitment is binding if the sender cannot open the commitment into a different value than the one it had committed to, where the commitment is hiding if before the decommitment stage the receiver does not learn the committed value. Fully-black-box reductions from commitment schemes to oneway functions were given by [15, 21] and [14, 23] .
In the new protocol (A, B), we embed an execution of (A, B) while using a commitment scheme in order to enforce the "defensible behavior" of A. Let i A , i B and r A , r B be the inputs and random-coins of A and B respectively. We define (A(i A , r A ), B(i B , r The hiding property of the commitment scheme yields that before the embedded execution of (A, B) starts, B does not learn any information about the input and random-coins that A uses in this execution. Thus, the semi-honest privacy of (A, B) w.r.t. B and f B , follows by the semi-honest privacy of (A, B) w.r.t. B and f B . In order to prove that (A, B) is (A, f A )-defensibly-private, we first note that a valid defense of A must include a valid opening of the commitment. Thus, the binding property of the commitment scheme yields that even a dishonest A * can only provide a valid defense if it has acted in the embedded execution of (A, B) as A whose input and random-coins are set to i A and r A ⊕ r 1 B would. Namely, if it has acted as A whose input was decided before the execution has started, and its random-coins are chosen at random would. Hence, the defensible privacy of the protocol w.r.t. A and f A , follows by the semi-honest privacy of (A, B) w.r.t. A and f A . 
Paper Organization
Section 2 contains the notations and definitions used in this paper. In Section 3 we present our general transformation from semi-honest privacy to defensible one (Theorem 1) and in Section 4 we use this transformation to derive our main result (Theorem 2).
Preliminaries

Notation
We denote by U n the random variable uniformly chosen in {0, 1}
n . Given a distribution D, we denote its support by Supp(D). We adopt the convention that when the same random variable occurs several times in an expression, all occurrences refer to a single sample. For example, Pr[f (U n ) = U n ] is defined to be the probability that when
for every polynomial p we have that μ(n) < 1/p(n) for large enough n. Two distribution ensembles D n and ξ n are computationally-indistinguishable (denoted D n ≈ c ξ n ), if no efficient algorithm distinguishes between them with more then negligible probability. Given a two-party protocol π = (A, B), we denote the inputs and random-coins of A and B by i A and i B , and by r A and r B respectively. We denote by View
). This view consists on i A , r A and the messages A received thought the protocol. We denote by View
, where R A and R B are uniformly chosen among all strings of the right length.
Black-Box Reductions
A reduction from a primitive P to a primitive Q consists of showing that if there exists an implementation C of Q, then there exists an implementation M C of P . This is equivalent to showing that for every adversary that breaks M C , there exists an adversary that breaks C. Such a reduction is semi-black-box if it ignores the internal structure of Q's implementation, and it is fully-black-box if the proof of correctness is black-box as well, i.e., the adversary for breaking Q ignores the internal structure of both Q's implementation and of the (alleged) adversary breaking P . A taxonomy of black-box reductions was provided by [25] , and the reader is referred to their paper for a more complete and formal view of these notions. All the reduction considered in this paper are fully-black-box ones.
Different Notions of Privacy
In the following we present the two privacy measures we use in this paper.
Semi-Honest Privacy
In the standard definitions of semi-honest privacy (c.f, [11] ), it is required that the semi-honest party does not learn any information about the other party's input, save but the part it suppose to get according to the prescribed functionality. Here we present a natural relaxation to the above, defining the notion of semi-honest privacy w.r.t. a function. Namely, we only require that the semi-honest party does not learn a predefined function of the parties' inputs. 
* be a function defined over the parties' inputs. We say that π is 
Defensible Privacy Definition 2 (defense). Let π = (A, B) be a two-party protocol and let t be a transcript of an interaction between some party
Remark 1. It seems natural to extend the above definition to a simulation based one. Namely, a protocol is defensibly private if a party that gives a valid defense learns nothing (in the simulation sense) other than the prescribed functionality. It is then seems tempting to try to reduce the above defensible privacy to semi-honest privacy (according to [11] ). Namely, to prove that any semi-honest private protocol implies a defensibly private version of this protocol. We hope to address this issue in the full version.
Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer is an interactive protocol between a sender, S, and a receiver, R. The sender gets as an input two secret bits: σ 0 and σ 1 and the receiver gets an index i ∈ {0, 1}, in the end of the protocol R locally outputs a single bit. We make the following correctness requirement: for all n and all valid values of σ 0 , σ 1 and i, with save but negligible probability the output of R in the interaction
Let (S, R) be a protocol that computes the oblivious transfer functionality, let
We say that (S, R) is a semi-honest [resp. defensible] oblivious transfer if it is (S, f S ) and (R, f R ) semi-honest private [resp. defensibly private]. The protocol (S, R) is (malicious) oblivious transfer if its computation is secure according to the real/ideal simulation paradigm (see [11, Chapter 7] for formal definition). The following is implicit in [17] .
Theorem 3 ([17]).
There exists a fully-black-box reduction from oblivious transfer to defensible oblivious transfer.
Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme is a two-stage protocol between a sender and a receiver. In the first stage, called the commit stage, the sender commits to a private string σ. In the second stage, called the reveal stage, the sender reveals σ and proves that it was the value to which she committed in the first stage. We require two properties of commitment schemes. The hiding property says that the receiver learns nothing about σ in the commit stage. The binding property says that after the commit stage, the sender is bound to a particular value of σ; that is, she cannot successfully open the commitment to two different values in the reveal stage. See [10] for a more formal definition. Fully-black-box reductions from commitment schemes to one-way functions were given by [15, 21] and [14, 23] .
One-Way Functions Definition 4. Let f : {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time computable function. f is one-way if the following is negligible for every ppt A,
Reducing Semi-honest Protocols to Defensible Ones
Our transformation from semi-honest privacy to defensible privacy (Theorem 1) immediately follows by applying the next lemma twice. The lemma informally states that it is possible to "upgrade" the security of a protocol w.r.t. one of its parties while maintaining the initial security w.r.t. the other party. Proof. In the following definition of π we are using a commitment scheme, Com. Recall that by [15, 22] and by [14, 23] , there exists a fully-black-box reduction from Com to one-way functions. Clearly π has the same functionality as π. Lemma 2 states that π maintains the same privacy w.r.t. B and f B . The heart of our proof is in Lemma 3, where we show that π has defensible privacy w.r.t. A and f A .
Lemma 1. Let π = (A, B) be a two-party protocol and let f
Protocol 1 [The defensible protocol π = (A, B)]
Lemma 2. Assume that π is
Proof. We assume that π is (B, f B )-semi-honest-private and prove that π is (B, f B )-semi-honest-private (the proof for the defensibly-private case is analogous). We first note that the hiding property of Com yields that for every , i B ) ). By the semi-honest privacy of π w.r.t. B and f B , we have that (View
Using the hiding property of Com once more, we have that (View (U k , i B ) ). Namely, we have proved that π is (B, f B )-semi-honest-private. (A, f A )-semi-honest-private, then π is (A, f A ) defensibly-private.
Lemma 3. Assume that π is
Proof. Assume toward a contradiction the existence of an efficient adversary A * and a distinguisher D that violate the defensible privacy of π w.r.t. A and f A . Namely, there exists a polynomial p such that for infinitely many n's D distinguishes with advantage at least 
In order to make the dependencies between its two stages explicit, D uses the variable z to transfer information from its first stage to its second stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Algorithm 1 [The distinguisher D]
. . . .
It is easy to verify that D is efficient given oracle access to A * and D, in the following we prove that D violates the semi-honest privacy of π w.r.t. A and f A . We consider a random execution of (A, B, D) with security parameter 1 n and define the random variable Sim n = (i A , i B , r A  *  , r B , trans) as A and B's inputs in the real execution of π, concatenated with A * and B's views in the simulation of π done in D's predicting stage. More precisely, 
It is easy to verify that |Ex x←Simn [Adv D (x)]| is exactly the advantage of D in breaking the semi-honest privacy of π w.r.t. A and f A .
We would like the relate the above success probability to that of D in predicting f A after a random execution of π . We define the distribution Real n = i Claim. The following hold:
1. For every n ∈ N and x ∈ Supp(Real n ), it holds that Sim n (x) ≤ Real n (x) 2. For large enough n there exists a set L n ⊆ {x ∈ Supp(Real n ) : IsGoodDef (x) = 1} for which the following hold: 
proving the first part of the claim. For x ∈ Supp(Real n ), let Decom(x) be the decommitment of Com given in Defense(x) (we set it to ⊥ if no valid defense is given). For S ⊆ {0, 1} * , we let W x (S) be the probability that the commitment embedded in x is decommitted to a value in S, conditioned only on the random-coins in x used for the commitment (and not on all x).
Heaviest(x) = argmax σ∈{0,1} * W x (α), breaking ties arbitrarily (say, by choosing the lexicographic smallest α) and let Others(x) = {0,
In the following we prove the two properties of L n .
Proving 2(a). We first observe that for every polynomial q, it holds that
. Assume otherwise, then we can design an adversary for breaking the binding Com. In the commit stage, the adversary acts as A * does in the first line of Protocol 1. Then it simulates the rest of the protocol twice (with the same prefix) and outputs the two decommitments implied by A * 's defenses. Thus, whenever Pr[
, our adversary breaks the binding of Com with probability Ω(
. Let x ∈ L n , and let X be a random variable drawn from Sim n conditioned that X[r A * , r (1)
where the second inequality holds since x ∈ L n . Since the value of X[i B , r 
Back to the proof the lemma. Let n be large enough be large enough so that Claim 3 holds and assume w. 
where 1 x∈Ln is one if x ∈ L n and zero otherwise, and the first equality holds since Out D (x, c) is a random coin if IsGoodDef (x) = 0. By Claim 3 we have that
Since Out D (x, c) = Out D (x, c) for every x ∈ Supp(Real n ) such that IsGoodDef (x) = 1, Claim 3 also yields that
and that
We conclude that
Since the above holds for infinitely many n's, it concludes the proof of Lemma 3 and thus the proof of Theorem 1.
Achieving the Main Result
In the following we prove Theorem 2, the main result of this paper. As corollary of Theorem 1, we have that there exists a fully-black-box reduction from defensible oblivious transfer to semi-honest oblivious transfer and one-way functions. This corollary together with Theorem 3, yields the existence of a fully-black-box reduction from malicious oblivious transfer to semi-honest oblivious transfer and one-way functions. Thus, the proof of the Theorem 2 is concluded by the following folklore theorem (proof given in the full version).
Theorem 4.
There exists a fully-black-box reduction from one-way functions to semi-honest oblivious transfer.
